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A Review Of The Proposed
Michigan Rules Of Evidence
By James K. Robinson and John W. Reed

INTRODUCTION
On January 6, 1977, the Supreme Court of Michigan entered an order stating that
it is considering adoption of the proposed Michigan Rules of Evidence which were
submitted to the Court by the committee which it appointed in March 1975. The Court
has solicited comments from interested persons regarding the proposed rules. A
copy of the Supreme Court's order is published in this issue of the Bar Journal. The
proposed rules are published in the January 26, 1977, issue of North Western Reporter, Second Series (Michigan Edition). The purpose of this article is to review in
general the background and substance of the proposed rules. More detailed information concerning the rules may be obtained by consulting the text of the rules and the
committee notes thereto.
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in detail the policy considerations
supporting adoption of each proposed rule which conflicts with prior Michigan law.
For the most part the proposed rules are identical with the Federal Rules of Evidence
and the policy considerations favoring adoption of the rules are discussed in the
Federal Advisory Committee Notes and the legislative history of the Federal Rules.
EVIDENCE LAW
REFORM GENERALLY
The first major effort to reform the
law of evidence was undertaken by the
American Law Institute in 1939. The
product of that effort was the publication of the Model Code of Evidence in
1942. At that time Professor Morgan,
in his foreword to the Model Code,
said:
"[Tlhe rules of evidence have become
so complicated as to invite comparison with equity pleading, of which
Story wrote that the ability to understand and apply them 'requires various talents, vast learning, and a
clearness and acuteness of perception, which belong only to very gifted
minds' ... It is time ... for radical
reformation of the law of evidence."
Morgan, Foreword, American Law
Institute, Model Code of Evidence 5
(1942).

The Model Code achieved little success in reforming the law of evidence.
In 1953 the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws published the Uniform Rules of
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Evidence, which substantially revised
the Model Code. Although the Uniform Rules were well received by
judges, lawyers and law professors, the
rules were enacted only by the Virgin
Islands. In 1965 the California Legislature enacted the California Evidence
Code. The California Code is based
upon the Uniform Rules; however, the
legislature modified them to comply
with California policy and practice. In
1967, the New Jersey Supreme Court
promulgated a modified version of the
Uniform Rules.
In 1965 the United States Supreme
Court appointed a committee to formulate rules of evidence for the federal
courts. The Federal Rules of Evidence
were enacted by Congress and became
effective July 1, 1975. At this writing
at least six states have adopted rules
of evidence patterned after the Federal
Rules. These states are Wisconsin,
Nevada, New Mexico, Nebraska, Maine
and Arkansas. A number of other
states are in the process of considering adoption of evidence rules similar
to the Federal Rules.
1977

For a more detailed discussion of the
background of evidence law reform,
including the background of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see Spangenberg, The Federal Rules of Evidence An Attempt at Uniformity in Federal
Courts, 15 Wayne L Rev 1061 (1969);
Hungate, An Introduction to the Proposed Rules ofEvidence, 32 Fed B J 225
(1973); Berger, An Introduction to the
FederalRules of Evidence, 2 Litigation
No. 1, p 8 (Fall 1975).
EVIDENCE LAW REFORM
IN MICHIGAN

questions, the judge or lawyer has
time to research the law before it is
applied. But questions involving the
admissibility of evidence arise suddenly during trial. Proper objections
- stating the correct grounds must be made immediately or the
lawyer may find that his objection
has been waived. The judge must
rule immediately in order that the
trial may progress in an orderly fashion. Frequently, evidence questions
cannot be anticipated and, hence,
necessary research often cannot be
done beforehand.
There is, therefore, an acute need for

a systematic, comprehensive, and auThe prospect of imminent adoption
thoritative statement of the law of
of the Federal Rules of Evidence
evidence that is easy to use and conprompted the Board of Commissioners
venient for immediate reference."
of the State Bar of Michigan to apWest's California Evidence Code
point a special committee in 1974 to
XXIII (1968).
consider the feasibility of adopting
The State Bar Board of Commisrules of evidence for Michigan. The
special committee issued a report en- sioners adopted a resolution in Dedorsing "the concept of a Michigan cember 1974 endorsing the report of
evidence code which adheres to the its special evidence committee. See
federal rules of evidence except where Report of the State Bar Special Comparticular state considerations require mittee on Uniform Rules of Evidence,
deviation." In support of its conclu- 53 Mich State B J 765 (1974). On
sion, the special committee quoted March 19, 1975, the Supreme Court of
from the report of the California Law Michigan issued an order constituting
Revision Commission recommending and appointing a committee to prepare
codification of California evidence law:
"In few, if any, areas of the law is
there as great a need for immediate
and accurate information as there is
in the law of evidence. On most legal

JamesK.
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proposed Michigan Rules of Evidence.
See Robinson, The Impact of Federal
Rules of Evidence on Michigan Evidence Law, 54 Mich State B J 193
(1975). The committee consisted of
representatives from the Judiciary,
the Legislature and the State Bar.
Persons serving on the committee had
diversified backgrounds and virtually
every segment of the legal community
was well represented.
HOW THE PROPOSED RULES
WERE DRAFTED
The manner in which the Supreme
Court Evidence Committee prepared
its proposed rules is described in the
Prologue to the rules:
"At [its first] meeting the Committee
unanimously agreed that it would
draft Michigan Rules of Evidence
generally patterned on the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Thereafter, the
Committee proceeded to consider
proposed rules of evidence using the
outline of the Federal Rules of Evidence as the agenda for the Committee's work.
"Before each meeting an agenda was
established and circulated to Committee members setting the proposed
rules to be considered at the Committee's next meeting. Ih addition,
before each meeting, legal memoranda were forwarded to Committee members discussing the impact
on Michigan law which would occur
through adoption of the proposed
rules ...
"At the Committee's meetings the
rules were taken up in the order set
out in the Federal Rules of Evidence.
After discussion of a proposed rule
and its impact on existing Michigan
law, motions were entertained to
adopt a form of the rule under consideration. These motions were discussed and thereafter voted on by
the Committee. At the conclusion of
the Committee's adoption of a full set
of proposed counterpart rules to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, one meeting ... was devoted to a review of all
MICHIGAN STATE BAR JOURNAL
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rules previously adopted to determine whether changes in specific
rules should be made by the Committee in light of the entire set of rules
adopted. A number of changes were
made at that meeting.
"Thereafter, the Chairman and Reporter prepared a draft of committee
notes. This draft was circulated for
review by the Committee, together
with several proposed technical
changes in the rules. At its [last]
meeting ... the Committee approved
the final draft of the Proposed
Michigan Rules of Evidence with
Committee Notes. At this meeting the
Committee authorized the Chairman
and Reporter to make all necessary
changes in the proposed rules and
committee notes and at the earliest
possible date thereafter to submit the
draft to the Supreme Court of Michigan for its consideration. The Committee directed the Chairman and
Reporter to communicate to the
Court that the Committee recommends that these proposed Michigan
Rules of Evidence be adopted by the
Court." Prologue, Proposed Michigan Rules of Evidence.
The source and format of the proposed rules are described in the Committee's General Comment:
"The Michigan Rules of Evidence are
drawn in large part from the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which took effect
July 1, 1975. The Committee Note following each Michigan rule indicates
its source. When that source is the
corresponding federal rule, the
Michigan Committee Note usually
does not restate the rule's background or comment on its meaning.
Rather the Federal Advisory Committee Notes and Congressional reports are allowed to speak for themselves. The few exceptions, in which
there are 'Committee Comments,' are
instances in which the Michigan
Committee doubts or disagrees with
views suggested in the federal preenactment materials, or in which the
Committee has devised a variant rule.
"The Committee's statements regarding 'Impact on Prior Michigan Law'

1977

merely indicate the Committee's perceptions of the correspondence, or
lack of it, between the rules and
prior Michigan law. Prepared as an
aid to Bench and Bar in the transition from prior Michigan law to these
rules, these statements are descriptive only, and not prescriptive. They
are not to be carried forward as a
gloss on the new rules." General
Comment, Proposed Michigan Rules
of Evidence.
The proposed Michigan Rules of
Evidence were submitted to the Supreme Court in January 1977 and
simultaneously published for comment
in the North Western Reporter, Second Series (Michigan Edition) pursuant to the Court's January 6, 1977,
order which is published in this issue
of the Bar Journal.
A BRIEF DESCRIPTION
OF THE MRE
As stated in the General Comment
to the proposed Michigan Rules of
Evidence (MRE), the proposed rules
are drawn in large part from the Federal Rules of Evidence. A major difference in approach exists between the
method of adopting the Federal Rules
and the method contemplated for
adopting the Michigan Rules. The
Federal Rules were enacted by Congress. The Michigan Rules will be
adopted by the Supreme Court of
Michigan. Adoption of the rules by the
Court rather than enactment by the
Legislature is consistent with the
Michigan Supreme Court's view of the
power committed to it by the Michigan
Constitution. In Perin v Peuler, 373
Mich 531, 541 (1964), the Court said:
"The function of enacting and
amending judicial rules of practice
and procedure [including the rules of
evidence] has been committed exclusively to this Court (Const 1908, art 7,
§ 5; Const 1963, art 6, § 5); a function
with which the legislature may not
meddle or interfere save as the Court
may acquiesce and adopt for retention at judicial will." Accord People v
Jackson, 391 Mich 323, 366 (1974).

With only minor changes to conform
the Federal Rules to state use, the
Michigan Rules of Evidence and the
Federal Rules are identical with the
following principal exceptions:
1. MRE 202 (Judicial Notice of Law);
2. MRE 302 (Presumptions in Criminal Cases);
3. MRE 404 (Character Evidence not
Admissible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes);
4. MRE 606 (Competency of Jurors
as Witnesses);
5. MRE 609 (Impeachment by Conviction of Crime);
6. MRE 611(b) (Scope of Cross-examination);
7. MRE 612 (Writing or Object Used
to Refresh Memory);
8. MRE 801(d)(1)(A) (hearsay - prior
inconsistent statements).
The nature of the differences between the proposed Michigan Rules
and the Federal Rules is such that little, if any, damage is done to the advantage of uniformity between federal
and state evidence law which will be
gained through the adoption of the
proposed Michigan evidence rules.
We shall now briefly describe the
proposed Michigan Rules, noting the
significant differences between them
and the Federal Rules and existing
Michigan law.
Article I
General Provisions
By virtue of the scope rule, MRE
101, the Michigan Rules of Evidence
govern all proceedings in Michigan
courts with the exception of four kinds
of situations specified in MRE 1101:
determination of preliminary questions of fact, grand jury proceedings,
summary contempt proceedings, and a
group of miscellaneous proceedings,
e.g., sentencing, and granting or revoking probation.
In keeping with the Michigan constitutional concept of judicial suprem-
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acy in matters of practice and procedure (see Perin v Peuler, 373 Mich 531
(1964)), the Michigan Rules of Evidence govern even when there is a
contrary statute (e.g., MRE 601 effectively displaces the Dead Man's Act).
MRE 101, provides, however, that
statutory evidence rules not in conflict
with the Michigan Rules of Evidence
remain in effect (e.g., MRE 501 preserves existing privileges, most of
which are statutory).
As the title suggests, the six rules in
Article I deal with concepts, most of
them orthodox and familiar, applicable to the presenting and receiving of
evidence generally. For example, the
rules are to be construed "to the end
that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined" (MRE
102); inadmissible evidence is not to
be suggested to members of the jury by
offers of proof or by improper questions in their hearing (MRE 103 (c));
harmless error is not ground for reversal (MRE 103 (a)); offers of proof generally are required (MRE 103(a)(2));
the court must instruct on admissibility for a limited purpose (MRE 105);
and the traditional rule of "completeness" directs the admission of the remainder of a writing (or another writing) "which ought in fairness to be
considered contemporaneously" with
the writing already introduced (MRE
106).

the condition."
This scheme is consistent with prior
Michigan law generally, although
there are aberrant holdings. MRE
104(d), however, which provides that
an accused does not, merely by testifying on a preliminary matter, subject
himself to cross-examination as to
other issues in the case, departs from
the holding in People v Johnson, 382
Mich 632, 640 (1969), that a defendant
by taking the stand waives his right to
refuse to answer "any question that
may be material to the case and which
would, in the case of any other witness, be legitimate cross-examination."
Article II
Judicial Notice
MRE 201 provides an orthodox pattern of judicial notice of "adjudicative
facts," i.e., the facts of the particular
case. In keeping with Michigan and
general authorities, facts are made
judicially noticeable when they are
"either (1) generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court or (2) capable of accurate and
ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." MRE 201 sets
forth the procedure for taking judicial
notice, and it makes the judicially
noticed fact conclusive on the jury in a
civil action, but not in a criminal case.

MRE 202, dealing with judicial
MRE 104 clarifies judge and jury notice of law, has no counterpart in
roles in determining questions con- the Federal Rules, it being the posicerning the qualification of witnesses, tion of the Federal Advisory Committhe existence of privileges, and the tee that "the manner in which law is
admissibility of evidence. Such ques- fed into the judicial process is never a
tions are generally for the court; and proper concern of the rules of evidence
in determining those questions, the but rather of the rules of procedure."
court is not bound by the rules of evi- The Michigan Committee concluded
dence except those relating to priv- that the convenience of lodging the
ileges. However, when relevancy of judicial notice of law rule adjacent to
evidence depends on the fulfillment the judicial notice of fact rule outof a condition of fact, the court is to weighed conceptual concerns; accordadmit it "upon, or subject to, the in- ingly it drafted MRE 202, patterned
troduction of evidence sufficient to after Rule 9 of the Uniform Rules of
support a finding of the fulfillment of Evidence (1953).
MICHIGAN STATE BAR JOURNAL
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In essence MRE 202 assumes that
the law of the various American jurisdictions should be treated as domestic
law, subject to judicial notice, a reflection of the effectiveness of modern
publishing and communication practices. Private acts, ordinances and
regulations of governmental subdivisions or agencies of Michigan, and the
law of foreign countries are also judicially noticeable, but only if a party so
requests, furnishes the court with
helpful information, and has given adverse parties adequate notice. MRE
202 represents a modest liberalization
of the procedures heretofore established by MCLA 600.2114a, 600.2118a
(3), and 24.261(6).
Article III
Presumptions
MRE 301 provides that civil presumptions shift only the burden of
going forward with evidence, and not
the burden of persuasion. In so providing the rule is identical with the corresponding federal rule. Once a presumption shifts the burden of going
forward with evidence, the party in
whose favor it operates is entitled to a
directed verdict on the issue if the adversary produces no evidence rebutting the presumption. In short, it is a
mandatory inference.
When rebutted the presumption disappears, a development sometimes
termed "the bursting of the bubble."
The implication is not entirely accurate, however, because MRE 301, like
its federal counterpart, permits the
basic facts of a rebutted presumption,
if logically supportive, to serve nevertheless as the basis of an inference and
allows the judge to inform the jury of
that permissible inference.
In all of this, MRE 301 is consistent
with prior Michigan law except for
some cases indicating that one traditionally strong presumption - that
of undue influence when a fiduciary
benefits from a relationship of trust may shift the burden of persuasion.

See e.g., Totorean v Samuels, 52 Mich
App 14 (1974).
MRE 302, dealing with presumptions in criminal cases, has no counterpart in the Federal Rules, Congress
having preferred to deal with the subject in connection with its pending revision of the federal criminal code.
MRE 302, which deals only with procedural matters and not validity,
makes clear that a criminal presumption is never mandatory, that the proof
beyond a reasonable doubt requirement is not affected, and that when
instructing the jury the court should
state that "it may, but need not, infer
the existence" of the presumed fact
from the basic facts. (Emphasis added.) In all of these matters, MRE 302
is consistent with prior Michigan law.
Article IV
Relevancy and Its Limits
The first three rules of Article IV
deal with relevancy generally, and the
remaining eight deal with particular
applications in areas frequently recurring.
MRE 401 views the issue of relevance as essentially one of logical or
rational relationship between evidence
offered and facts that are "of consequence to the determination of the action." The quoted phrase has the same
meaning as the more traditional term,
"material," a term generally avoided
in the federal and proposed Michigan
rules.
The test of relevancy is whether the
evidence has "any tendency" to make
the disputed fact "more probable or
less probable than it would be without
the evidence." On the whole, the relevancy threshold is low and the rule is
generally consistent with prior Michigan law.
MRE 402, essentially a technical
provision, excludes irrelevant evidence
and admits all relevant evidence "except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, the
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Constitution of the State of Michigan,
these rules, or other rules adopted by
the Supreme Court."
Perhaps no provision of the proposed
rules will have a more pervasive effect
than MRE 403, which reads as follows:
"Although relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
The rule directs a weighing of probative value against the "costs" of the
evidence in terms of the prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. The rule is
consistent with prior Michigan law.
People v Der Martzex, 390 Mich 410,
415 (1973). However, the scheme of
MRE 401 and 403, which requires
counsel and the court to consider relevancy questions in three steps - first,
testing for probative value; second,
identifying the "costs;" and third,
weighing probative value against
prejudice, etc. - should produce
clearer, wiser and fairer rulings.

counterpart, however, in excluding
evidence of the character of the victim
of a sexual conduct crime, except for
evidence of the victim's past sexual
conduct with the accused and evidence
of specific instances of sexual activity
to show the source or origin of semen,
pregnancy, or disease, and then only if
the court determines that probative
value is not "substantially outweighed" by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. The rule is thus consonant with Michigan's recently
enacted statute covering sexual conduct crimes. See MCLA 750.520j.
MRE 405 identifies the appropriate
methods of proving character. Generally character may be proved only by
reputation or opinion; but in those
cases in which character is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of conduct. MRE 405,
which is identical with Federal Rule
405, departs from prior Michigan law
and common law generally - in
permitting proof of character by opinion as well as by reputation evidence.

MRE 406 follows prior Michigan
MRE 404, the first of eight rules law in making admissible evidence of
dealing with relevance questions in the habit of a person or the routine
particular settings, adopts the or- practice of an organization to prove
thodox prohibition against the use of a that the conduct of the person or ortrait of character to prove that an in- ganization on a particular occasion
dividual acted in conformity therewith was in conformity with that habit or
on a particular occasion. The rule then routine practice.
adopts three familiar exceptions: First,
MRE 407 follows Michigan prior
one accused of a crime may offer evi- practice in making evidence of remedence of his good character, and the dial measures taken after an event inprosecutor may then join the issue and admissible to prove negligence or
offer evidence of bad character; second,
culpable conduct. For similar policy
the accused may offer evidence of a
reasons, MRE 408 renders inadmissipertinent trait of character of the
ble evidence of compromises and offers
victim of the crime, and the prosecutor to compromise. In one aspect, however,
may rebut; and third, parties may this latter rule changes prior Michioffer evidence of the character of a gan law. It states that "Evidence of
witness bearing on credibility, as pro- conduct or statements made in comvided in some detail in MRE 607, 608, promise negotiations is likewise not
and 609.
admissible." Michigan has traditionMRE 404 differs from its federal ally admitted factual statements made
MICHIGAN STATE BAR JOURNAL
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during compromise negotiations, protecting, for practical purposes, only
express settlement offers and hypothetical statements. Believing the orthodox rule a trap for the unwary, and
in any event inconsistent with the general purposes of the rule, the Michigan
Committee elected to employ the language quoted, which is also contained
in Federal Rule 408.

not merely to show the insured's negligence.
Article V
Privileges
In common with the Federal Rules
of Evidence but for somewhat different
reasons, the Michigan Rules of Evidence contain no provisions dealing
with specific privileges. MRE 501
reads as follows:
"The privilege of a witness, person,
government, state, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by
the principles of the common law except as modified by statute or court
rule."

In yet another protective provision,
MRE 409 makes evidence of paying or
promising to pay medical and similar
expenses inadmissible to prove liability for the injury treated.
MRE 410 renders inadmissible
pleas of guilty later withdrawn, pleas
Thus, the rule carries forward prior
of nolo contendere, offers to plead Michigan law with respect to priviguilty or nolo contendere, and state- leges, whether common-law in origin,
ments made in connection with any of e.g., the attorney-client privilege, or
the foregoing pleas or offers. Prior statutory, e.g., the physician-patient
Michigan cases agree that a plea of privilege.
guilty later withdrawn and statements
Article VI
made in connection therewith are inWitnesses
admissible, but they are less clear as
to the admissibility of offers to plead
MRE 601 reads:
guilty or nolo contendere. To the ex"Every person is competent to be a
tent that certain prior Michigan cases
witness
except as otherwise provided
may be read to allow evidence of such
in these rules."
offers, they are rejected by MRE 410.
The United States Supreme Court's
MRE 410 further provides, however,
for the admissibility in perjury cases Advisory Committee, commenting on
of evidence of statements made in identical language in its draft, said:
connection with pleas and offers to
"This general ground-clearing
plead when made by defendant under
eliminates all grounds of incompetency not specifically recognized in
oath, on the record, and in the presthe succeeding rules of this Article."
ence of counsel. The Michigan Committee found no Michigan authority
Most of the common-law grounds of
inconsistent with that provision.
incompetency have long since been
Finally, MRE 411 makes evidence eliminated in Michigan as elsewhere,
of liability insurance inadmissible to e.g., conviction of infamous crime,
prove negligence or wrongful conduct. interest in the outcome of litigation,
In the form adopted, however, this marriage, etc. MRE 601 is inconsisfamiliar rule does not require the ex- tent with prior Michigan law, howclusion of such evidence when offered ever, in eliminating the few grounds
for another purpose, such as proof of that remain.
ownership or control, or the bias of a
Chief among these is the Dead
witness, and in this regard may Man's Act, MCLA 600.2116; GCR
change prior Michigan law which ap- 1963, 608. The 1967 amendment to the
pears to have prohibited introduction Act permitting a party to testify as to
of liability insurance for all purposes, matters "equally within the knowlMICHIGAN STATE BAR JOURNAL
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edge of the person incapable of testifying" if "some material portion of his
testimony is supported by some other
material evidence tending to corroborate his claim" has had the effect of
diminishing the exclusionary force of
the Act already, particularly because
the cases have required very little corroboration to avoid the statute.

having concluded that the question is
one of substantive law rather than of
evidence and that, in any event, the
area is inappropriately governed by an
inflexible rule, being more suitably
subject to case law development.
MRE 607 is the first of three rules
dealing with impeachment of witnesses. It provides simply that:
MRE 601 is inconsistent also with
"The credibility of a witness may
prior Michigan cases suggesting that
be attacked by any party, including
the party calling him."
determinations of competency to testify where there are problems of menAlthough inconsistent with the ortal or moral qualification are within thodox and Michigan view that a witthe court's discretion. The question of ness' credibility generally may not be
mental capacity is particularly suited attacked by the party calling him, the
to the jury as one of weight and credi- new rule represents a less than starbility, subject to judicial authority to tling change because of the numerous
review the sufficiency of the evidence; exceptions to the traditional rule. For
and standards of moral qualifications example, prior Michigan law recogare dealt with by the manner of ad- nized the right of a party to impeach
ministering the oath under MRE 603. his own witness if the witness was adMRE 602 requires the witness to verse or hostile, if the party was taken
have personal knowledge of the matter by surprise by the witness' testimony,
testified to (except in the case of opin- if the witness was a res gestae witness
ion testimony by expert witnesses), whom the prosecution was obliged to
and MRE 603 requires him to "declare call, or where the witness' recollection
that he will testify truthfully, by oath needed to be refreshed by his prior inor affirmation administered in the consistent statements.
form calculated to awaken his conMRE 608 provides that the credibilscience and impress his mind with his ity of a witness may be attacked by eviduty to do so." In both regards the new dence of character for untruthfulness
rules effect no change in Michigan (and, if attacked, supported similarly).
law.
The evidence may be in the form of
MRE 604 somewhat tightens the reputation, and to that extent the rule is
procedure for using interpreters, re- wholly consistent with prior Michigan
quiring them to be sworn and to be law. The rule provides also, however,
that the evidence may be in the form of
qualified as experts.
opinion, and to that extent it is inconsisMRE 605 and 606 render judge and tent with prior Michigan law.
juror incompetent to testify in the trial
MRE 608(b) prohibits extrinsic proof
of the case in which they are sitting,
of
specific instances of conduct (other
and no apparent change in Michigan
than
convictions) bearing on credibilpractice is effected thereby.
ity, but it permits, in the court's discreFederal Rule 606 contains a provi- tion, cross-examination about specific
sion dealing with whether testimony, instances if deemed probative of truthaffidavits, or statements of a juror fulness or untruthfulness. Except that
may be received for the purpose of in- the cases do not clearly limit inquiry to
validating or supporting a verdict or conduct probative of truthfulness or unindictment. MRE 606 contains no truthfulness, MRE 608(b) is generally
counterpart, the Michigan Committee in accord with prior Michigan law.
MICHIGAN STATE BAR JOURNAL
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In the sessions of the Michigan Committee, as in the Congressional hearings, the question of impeachment of a
witness by evidence of conviction of a
crime, covered by MRE 609, generated
more discussion and controversy than
any other rule. The proposed Michigan
rule is identical with its federal counterpart with respect to what might be
called the four auxiliary provisions: (b)
time limit; (c) effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation;
(d)juvenile adjudications; and (e) pendency of appeal. With respect to the general rule stated in subdivision (a), however, the proposed Michigan rule differs
from the federal equivalent by creating
separate rules, one applicable only to
criminal defendants (MRE 609(a)(1))
and another applicable to all other witnesses (MRE 609(a)(2)).

es, the court has no discretion to exclude evidence of such a conviction for
impeachment purposes. Thus, the principal departures from prior Michigan
law are:

1) Misdemeanor convictions are
made admissible to impeach witnesses in criminal cases if the misdemeanor involves dishonesty or
false statement and, in the case of a
witness-accused, the court determines that the conviction is more
probative on the issue of credibility
than unfairly prejudicial. Cf. People v
Renno, 392 Mich 45 (1974) (no misdemeanor impeachment in criminal
cases).
2) Misdemeanor convictions are
made admissible to impeach witnesses in civil cases only if the misdemeanor involves dishonesty or
false statement. Cf. Sting v Davis, 384
Mich 608 (1971) (traffic misdemeanThe heart of MRE 609(a) is a diviors allowed to impeach driversion of crimes into two categories
witnesses in automobile negligence
(crimes punishable by death or by imcases).
prisonment in excess of one year, and
3) Felony convictions not involving
crimes involving dishonesty or false
dishonesty or false statement are
statement regardless of the punishadmissible in all types of cases only
ment), which are then applied someif the court determines that probawhat differently to a witness-accused
tive value on credibility outweighs
and to all other witnesses.
prejudicial effect. Cf. Sting v Davis,
supra (no discretion in a civil case to
With respect to all witnesses, indeny cross-examination regarding
cluding a witness-accused, conviction
the driving record of a plaintiffof a serious crime (i.e., one punishable
driver or a defendant-driver).
by death or by imprisonment for more
MRE 609(b) establishes a presumpthan a year) but not involving dishonesty or false statement, may be shown tive "statute of limitations," generally
only if "the court determines that the excluding proof of convictions more
probative value of admitting this evi- than ten years after release of the
dence on the issue of credibility out- witness from the confinement imposed
for that conviction, a rule somewhat
weighs its prejudicial effect."
As to the other category of crimes more precise than but generally in accord with the principle of People v
(those that involve dishonesty or false
Jackson, 391 Mich 323 (1974).
statement, without regard to severity
MRE 609(d), though providing for
of punishment) a distinction is drawn
between a witness-accused and all the general inadmissibility of evidence
other witnesses. In the case of the of juvenile adjudications, does auwitness-accused, conviction of a crime thorize a court in a criminal case to
involving dishonesty may be admitted, admit evidence of a juvenile adjudicaagain, only if the court determines tion of a witness other than the acthat probative value outweighs preju- cused where such an offense would be
dicial effect; but as to all other witness- admissible to attack the credibility of
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an adult and the court is "satisfied
that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the
issue of guilt or innocence."
Although MCLA 712A.23 purports
to bar the use of a juvenile adjudication "for any purpose whatever," the
Court of Appeals in a series of cases
since 1971 has followed a rule similar
to MRE 609(b). See, e.g., People v
Hawkins, 58 Mich App 69 (1975).
MRE 610, making evidence of religious beliefs or opinions inadmissible
on credibility, is in accord with prior
Michigan law.
MRE 611, dealing with mode and
order of interrogation and presentation, has three subdivisions: (a) control
by court; (b) scope of cross-examination; and (c) leading questions. All
three are consistent with prior Michigan law.
The only controversial question in
the rule is that of scope of crossexamination. The Federal Rules of
Evidence retained the federal and
majority practice of limiting crossexamination to the subject matter of
the direct examination and, of course,
matters affecting the credibility of the
witness. MRE 611(b) conforms with
prior Michigan law and adopts the
rule of broad scope, subject to limitation by the judge "in the interests of
justice."
MRE 612 establishes, in some detail, the procedure to be followed when
a writing or object is used to refresh a
witness' memory. In general, it is designed to give an adversary access to
the item that has been used to refresh.
The court may require production of a
writing or object that was used to refresh the memory of the witness even
before he took the stand. Here a matter of discretion, the requirement may
have been mandatory in prior Michigan practice. See Miles v Clairmont
Transfer Co., 35 Mich App 319 (1971).
MRE 613 deals with prior stateMICHIGAN STATE BAR JOURNAL
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ments of witnesses. MRE 613(a) rejects prior Michigan practice, based on
the rule in "The Queen's Case," requiring a written statement to be
shown to the witness before he is
cross-examined on it. The new rule
eliminates the requirement of a prior
display, providing only that "on request the same shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel."
MRE 613(b), relating to extrinsic
evidence of prior inconsistent statements, retains the familiar foundation
requirement but in modified form: it is
sufficient that the witness be afforded
an opportunity to explain or deny the
prior statement and the opposite party
afforded an opportunity to interrogate
him thereon. The opportunity need not
precede proof of the prior statement.
MRE 614 makes explicit the timehonored power of a court to call witnesses and interrogate them. There
clearly is Michigan authority for the
latter proposition, less clearly for the
former.
MRE 615 requires, with certain exceptions, the exclusion of witnesses on
request of a party. Michigan cases
have held such exclusion discretionary
with the trial court; the mandatory
exclusion under the rule is to that extent inconsistent with prior Michigan
law.
Article VII
Opinions and Expert Testimony
The six rules dealing with opinions
and expert testimony are drawn verbatim from the Federal Rules of Evidence. These rules have been widely
regarded as a significant liberalization
of the rules and procedures governing
such testimony. Viewed in the light of
prior Michigan law, however, they
represent somewhat less change in
this jurisdiction.
MRE 701 (opinion testimony by lay
witnesses) and MRE 702 (testimony
by experts) make the threshold test for
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admissibility of opinion that of "value"
or "helpfulness" or "assistance," rather
than the more restrictive test of
'necessity."
Roughly stated, under the necessity
principle opinion by a lay witness is
admitted only if the witness needs to
employ it in order to communicate
adequately with the trier of fact, and
opinion by an expert is admissible
only when needed for understanding
by the trier of fact. Under the value
test, lay opinion is admissible if it is
helpful to a clear understanding of the
witness' testimony and the testimony
of an expert is admissible if it will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence.
Although the difference is to some
extent one of semantics, the value test
encourages significantly greater admissibility. The Michigan cases have
tended in that direction; but to the extent that there has been doubt in the
cases, MRE 701 and 702 resolve it by
adopting the value test.
The significant provision in MRE
703, dealing with bases of opinion testimony by experts, is that the facts or
data on which an expert bases an opinion need not be admissible in evidence
"if of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject." Although there is some supporting Michigan authority for this
proposition, it appears to be inconsistent with the majority of Michigan
cases.
MRE 704 provides that opinion testimony is not objectionable merely because it "embraces an ultimate issue
to be decided by the trier of fact." The
rule is consistent with prior Michigan
law as to testimony of experts, but it is
not clear that Michigan has permitted
lay opinions on ultimate issues. In any
event, the new rule permits such opinions if they are otherwise admissible
("helpful," among other things).

MRE 705 permits the expert to give
an opinion and the reason therefor
without prior disclosure of the underlying facts, these being left to
cross-examination, unless the court
requires otherwise. This accords with
prior Michigan practice.
MRE 706 authorizes and provides
procedural rules governing courtappointed experts, a practice not provided for in prior Michigan law. Of
primary interest are the provisions
authorizing the court in its discretion
to disclose to the jury the fact that the
court appointed the witness, and permitting the parties to call expert witnesses of their own choice.
Article VIII
Hearsay
Article VIII of the proposed Michigan Rules of Evidence deals with the
hearsay rule and is substantially identical with Article VIII of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. The sole exception
is that MRE 801(d)(1)(A), which governs the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements of witnesses, is
identical with the United States Supreme Court version of Federal Rule
801(d)(1)(A) rather than the version
subsequently adopted by Congress.
MRE 801(a),(b) and (c) contain the
definitial elements of the hearsay rule.
The definition of hearsay in MRE
801(c) is consistent with prior Michigan law:
'Hearsay' is a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered
in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted."
MRE 801(a) defines a "statement"
for purposes of the hearsay rule to
exclude statements or conduct not intended as an assertion. Accordingly, it
is consistent with the Supreme Court's
recent decision in People v Stewart,
397 Mich 1, 9-10 (1976).

MRE 801(d)(1) governs the admis-
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party-opponent. Prior Michigan law
treated party admissions under an exception to the hearsay rule, while
MRE 801(d)(2) provides that they are
not hearsay at all. MRE 801(d)(2)(A)
is consistent with prior Michigan law
and the statement is ... inconsistent in admitting statements of a party
with his testimony ... " MRE 801(d) against the party. Under MRE 801
(1)(A) differs from the counterpart (d)(2)(A) a guilty plea by a party
Federal Rule which requires that the would be admissible against him in a
statement must also have been "given subsequent civil action arising out of
under oath subject to the penalty of the same occurrence.
perjury at a trial, hearing or other
To this extent MRE 801(d)(2)(A) is
proceeding, or in a deposition ..." inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
MRE 801(d)(1)(A) is inconsistent with recent decision in Wheelock v Eyl, 393
prior Michigan law which limits the Mich 74, 79 (1974), in which the Court
admissibility of prior inconsistent stated that: "A criminal conviction
statements to the purpose of impeach- after trial, or plea, or payment of a
ing credibility and prohibits their use fine is not admissible as substantive
as substantive evidence.
evidence of conduct at issue in a civil
For the policy arguments supporting case arising out of the same occurthese alternative rules, see the Advi- rence." Wheelock involved the admissory Committee Note and legislative sibility of payment of a traffic ticket in
history regarding Federal Rule 801 a subsequent automobile negligence
case arising out of the same occur(d)(1)(A).
MRE 801(d)(1)(B) is inconsistent rence. Certain dicta in the case have
with prior Michigan law in admitting been criticized:
as substantive evidence (as well as for
"The Michigan Supreme Court, alrehabilitation of credibility) prior conthough reaching the correct result on
the Wheelock facts of payment of a
sistent statements of a witness "to
traffic fine, appears to have gone berebut an express or implied charge
yond merely excluding guilty pleas
against him of recent fabrication or
to minor traffic violations and to
improper influence or motive ..."
have fashioned a rule that also exMichigan courts have admitted prior
cludes guilty pleas to more serious
consistent statements for these purviolations. This expansion of the
poses, but only on the issue of credibilholding to situations beyond those at
ity and not as substantive evidence.
issue seems unnecessary as well as
unwise. The probative value of adMRE 801(d)(1)(C) is consistent with
missions
against interest, though
prior Michigan law in admitting the
minimal when pleas to minor violatestimony of a witness as to his own
tions are involved, is much greater
prior identification of a person made
when the plea is to a major offense."
after perceiving him. The only differNote, 24 Kansas L Rev 193, 202 (1975).
ence between MRE 801(d)(1)(C) and
See also Robinson, Civil and Criminal
prior Michigan law is that Michigan
Evidence, 1975 Ann Survey of Mich
has previously treated statements of
Law, 22 Wayne L Rev 447, 471-72
prior identification as an exception to
(1976).
the hearsay rule, while MRE 801(d)
If the Supreme Court is inclined to
(1)(C) provides that such statements retain the Wheelock rule, at least as to
are not hearsay at all.
misdemeanors, it could do so by the
MRE 801(d)(2) governs the admis- addition of a Rule 412 to the MRE
sibility of certain admissions by a which could read as follows:
sibility of certain prior statements of
witnesses. MRE 801(d)(1)(A) provides
that "[a] statement is not hearsay if
[t]he declarant testifies at the trial
or hearing and is subject to crossexamination concerning the statement
-..
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"Evidence that a person has been
convicted of a crime after trial, or
plea or payment of a fine is not admissible as substantive evidence of
conduct at issue in a civil case arising out of the same occurrence, unless the crime was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of
one year under the law under which
he was convicted."

Prior Michigan law has been more restrictive, requiring preliminary proof
that the employee or agent had authority from his principal to make the
statement involved.
MRE 801(d)(2)(E) is consistent with
Michigan law in authorizing admission of "a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and
in furtherance of the conspiracy."

If the Court wishes to retain the
MRE 802 simply provides that:
Wheelock rule as to all crimes, including felonies, the foregoing Rule 412 "Hearsay is not admissible except as
could be adopted with the deletion of provided by these rules." This rule is
the language "unless the crime was consistent with current Michigan law
punishable by death or imprisonment to the extent that hearsay is not adin excess of one year under the law missible unless it falls within one of
the recognized exceptions to the hearunder which he was convicted."
say rule.
MRE 801(d)(2)(B) is consistent with
MRE 803 governs exceptions to the
prior Michigan law in admitting adoptive admissions of a party. To the ex- hearsay rule where the availability of
tent MRE 801(d)(2)(B) could au- the declarant is immaterial to admisthorize admission of a noncustodial sibility. Most of the MRE 803 hearsay
admission by silence of an accused in exceptions are generally consistent
the face of an accusation, it appears to with prior Michigan law. See, e.g.:
conflict with People v Bobo, 390 Mich
1. MRE 803(2) (Excited utterance);
355 (1973), which held that an ac2. MRE 803(3) (Then existing mencused's silence cannot be admitted
tal, emotion or physical condiagainst him. See Robinson, Civil and
tion);
Criminal Evidence, 1974 Ann Survey
3. MRE 803(5) (Recorded recollecof Mich Law, 21 Wayne L Rev 437,
tion);
476-478 (1975).
4. MRE 803(9) (Records of vital
Bobo, however, was decided on constatistics);
stitutional rather than evidence
5. MRE 803(11) (Records of religigrounds and thus MRE 801(d)(2)(B)
ous organizations);
would not directly conflict with Bobo
6.
MRE 803(12) (Marriage, baptissince no effort has been made in the
mal, and similar certificates);
proposed Michigan rules to codify
7.
MRE 803(13) (Family records);
rules excluding evidence on constitutional grounds.
8. MRE 803(14) (Records of documents affecting an interest in
MRE 801(d)(2)(C) is consistent with
property);
prior Michigan law in authorizing
9.
MRE 803(16) (Statements in anadmission of statements by a person
cient documents);
authorized by a party to make a
10. MRE 803(17) (Market reports,
statement concerning the subject.
commercial publications);
MRE 801(d)(2)(D) authorizes ad11.
MRE
803(18) (Learned treatises);
mission of a statement by the em12. MRE 803(19) (Reputation conployee or agent of a party "concerning
cerning personal or family hisa matter within the scope of his
tory);
agency or employment made during
the existence of the relationship."
13. MRE 803(20) (Reputation conMICHIGAN STATE BAR JOURNAL

JANUARY,

1977

lic records and reports to prove matters recorded therein. MRE 803(10)
permits proof of the absence of a public
record or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of certain matters which would
The MRE 803 hearsay exceptions
have been recorded in a public record,
which depart significantly from prior
by showing the absence of the applicaMichigan law are as follows:
ble public record through testimony or
a certificate from an authorized custo1. MRE 803(1) admits statements
dian of the records. These rules are
describing or explaining an event or
generally consistent with prior Michicondition made while the declarant
gan law; however, MRE 803(8)(C) is
was perceiving the event or condition,
inconsistent in authorizing admission
or immediately thereafter. No prior
Michigan authority specifically recog- of certain evaluative reports containnizes an exception for such state- ing factual findings in civil cases and
against the government in criminal
ments; however, the admission of such
statements may have been justified by cases "unless the sources of information or other circumstances clearly inMichigan courts from time to time in
the past under the so-called "res ges- dicate lack of trustworthiness."
tae" exception to the hearsay rule.
5. MRE 803(15) admits relevant
statements in documents affecting an
2. MRE 803(4) admits certain
statements made for purposes of medi- interest in property under certain circumstances. No prior Michigan aucal diagnoses or treatment, including
statements describing medical history, thority was located authorizing admission or requiring exclusion of such
past or present symptoms, etc. While
evidence.
prior Michigan law admitted declarations of present physical or mental
6. MRE 803(22) admits evidence of
condition (unless made to a physician
felony judgments to prove "any fact
seen for purposes of litigation), prior essential to sustain the judgment";
Michigan law did not generally admit
however, in criminal cases the govother types of statements (e.g., medical ernment cannot offer criminal judghistories) simply because they were ments against persons other than the
made for purposes of medical diagnosis accused except as may be permitted
or treatment.
for impeachment. This rule is incon3. MRE 803(6) admits certain busi- sistent with the Supreme Court's reness records and MRE 803(7) permits cent decision in Wheelock v Eyl, 393
proof of the nonoccurence or nonexist- Mich 74, 79 (1974), to the extent that
ence of certain matters by showing the MRE 803(22) would authorize proof of
absence of an entry in business rec- a felony conviction (by trial or plea) in
ords. These rules are generally con- a subsequent civil action arising out of
sistent with MCLA 600.2146, the the same occurrence. In Wheelock the
business records statute. The major Court held "that a criminal conviction
difference between MRE 803(6) and after trial or plea, or payment of a fine
prior Michigan law is that under
is not admissible as substantive eviMRE 803(6) statements of opinions or dence of conduct at issue in a civil case
diagnoses contained in business rec- arising out of the same occurrence."
ords may also be admissible in appro7. MRE 803(23) authorizes admispriate circumstances. Such statements sion of certain judgments as to perhave not generally been admissible sonal, family or general history, or
under prior Michigan law.
boundaries if the same would be prov4. MRE 803(8) admits certain pub- able by reputation evidence. No prior
cerning boundaries or general
history); and
14. MRE 803(21) (Reputation as to
character).
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Michigan authority was located authorizing admission or requiring exclusion of such evidence.
MRE 804 governs exceptions to the
hearsay rule where the unavailability
of the declarant is a condition of admissibility. The various tests of unavailability under MRE 804(a) (e.g.,
excused by privilege, persistent refusal to testify despite court order,
lack of memory, death or disability,
absence from jurisdiction) are generally consistent with prior Michigan
law.
The MRE 804 hearsay exceptions
are generally consistent with prior
Michigan law; however, they all have
some variations:
1. MRE 804(b)(1) admits the former testimony of an unavailable declarant if the party against whom the
testimony is presently offered (including a predecessor in interest in a civil
case) "had an opportunity and similar
motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination."
This rule is consistent with prior
Michigan law except that: a) former
testimony from a different proceeding
is not admissible in Michigan against
the accused in criminal cases; and
b) no Michigan authority was located
authorizing admission of former testimony against a "predecessor in
interest." Since the Michigan criminal
cases excluding former testimony from
a different proceeding are based upon
constitutional grounds of confrontation rather than evidence grounds,
adoption of MRE 804(b)(1) would not
necessarily change Michigan law.
2. MRE 804(b)(2) authorizes admission of statements made under belief of impending death (i.e., dying declarations). Unlike prior Michigan law,
however, the statements may be admitted in civil cases as well as homicide cases and the declarant need not
have died, so long as belief of imminent death existed when the statement was made and the declarant is

unavailable at trial.
3. MRE 804(b)(3) authorizes admission of statements against interest,
including statements against penal
interest as well as pecuniary and
proprietary interest. Prior Michigan
law is in accord, except that the Supreme Court in People v Edwards, 396
Mich 551 (1976) recently rejected the
requirement found in MRE 804(b)(3)
that: "A statement tending to expose
the declarant to criminal liability and
offered to exculpate the accused is not
admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statements." If the
court wishes to retain the holding in
Edwards rejecting the corroboration
requirement, it can do so easily by deleting the foregoing sentence from

MRE 804(b)(3).
4. MRE 804(b)(4) is generally consistent with prior Michigan law in
recognizing a hearsay exception for
statements of personal and family history by unavailable declarants. This
exception is sometimes called the
"pedigree exception." However, MRE
804(b)(4) is inconsistent with prior
Michigan law: a) in rejecting the requirement that the statements be
made when there was no motive to falsify (i.e., "ante litem motam"), and
b) in rejecting the requirement that
the declarant be related by blood or
marriage to the person of whose pedigree he speaks. MRE 804(b)(4) requires only "intimate association."
Both MRE 803 and MRE 804 contain so-called residual hearsay exceptions. Under MRE 803(24) and 804
(b)(5), hearsay statements which fall
within none of the specific exceptions
may nevertheless be admitted, provided that they have "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" and if they meet certain other
specific requirements, including pretrial notice of intent to offer the evidence. The Senate Judiciary Committee, speaking of the identical federal
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counterparts to MRE 803(24) and
804(b)(5) said:
"It is intended that the residual
hearsay exceptions will be used very
rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances. The committee does not
intend to establish a broad license
for trial judges to admit hearsay
statements which do not fall within
one of the other exceptions contained in 803 and 804(b)."
MRE 805 is consistent with prior
Michigan law in authorizing admission of hearsay within hearsay "if each
part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay
rule provided in these rules."
MRE 806 permits the credibility of
a hearsay declarant to be attacked like
any other witness and specifically rejects the requirement of prior Michigan law that before extrinsic evidence
of the declarant's inconsistent statements may be offered (even to impeach
an unavailable hearsay declarant), the
declarant must have been afforded an
opportunity to deny or explain the
statement.
Article IX
Authentication and Identification
The three rules in Article IX list the
traditional means of identifying or establishing the authenticity of documents, telephone conversations, data
compilations, and the like. Except for
minor adjustments to make the language appropriate to state circumstance, the rules are drawn from the
Federal Rules of Evidence and are
generally consistent with prior Michigan law.
Rule 901 states that the requirement of authentication or identification is satisfied "by evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims."
The rule then gives, "by way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation," examples of authentication conforming with the requirements of the
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rule, such as testimony by a witness
with knowledge, circumstantial authentication, ancient documents (here
twenty years, rather than the thirty
required in prior Michigan law), or
any method "provided by the Supreme
Court of Michigan or by a Michigan
statute." MRE 902 recognizes some
writings, mostly public, as authentic
without extrinsic evidence. Among
these self-authenticating items are
certain domestic and foreign public
documents, certified copies of public
records, newspapers and periodicals,
trade inscriptions, acknowledged documents, and the like. (It should be
noted that MRE 901 and MRE 902 do
not satisfy other possible objections,
such as hearsay, but satisfy only the
requirement of authentication as a
condition precedent to admissibility.)
MRE 903 excuses the production of
a subscribing witness unless by law
the validity of the instrument is conditional on the subscription.
Article X
Contents of Writings,
Records, and Photographs
What lawyers often call the "best
evidence rule" is the subject of Article
X. The eight rules in this Article,
though generally consistent with prior
Michigan practice, provide both
clarification and accommodation to
contemporary modes of recording, storing, and copying information.

MRE 1002 employs traditional
terms to state the basic rule:
"To prove the content of a writing,
recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or statute."
MRE 1001, however, defining the
terms used in Article X, creates the
concept of a "duplicate," which is:
"a counterpart produced by the
same impression as the original, or
from the same matrix, or by means of
1977

photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by
chemical reproduction, or by other
equivalent techniques, which accurately reproduces the original."
Then, MRE 1003 makes duplicate
admissible
"to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised
as to the authenticity of the original
or (2) in the circumstances it would
be unfair to admit the duplicate in
lieu of the original."
This patently useful procedure has
not heretofore been available in Michigan except for certain business records, and even there with substantial
restrictions. See MCLA 600.2146-8.
As in prior Michigan practice, MRE
1004 excuses production of the original if the original is lost or destroyed,
cannot be obtained by judicial process,
is in possession of the opponent and
the opponent is on notice that the original will be needed at the hearing, or
relates to a collateral matter. If the
original is thus excused the proponent
may offer any other evidence of contents, there being no "degrees" of secondary evidence recognized. Prior
Michigan law was unclear on this
matter.
Baroda State Bank v Peck, 235 Mich
542 (1926), is often cited as authority
for the proposition that Michigan recognizes no degrees of secondary evidence. In fact, however, the Baroda
opinion was divided 4-4, thus affirming a trial court ruling that there are
degrees of secondary evidence. MRE
1004's resolution of the issue may or
may not have changed Michigan law.
By the terms of MRE 1006, certified
or compared copies of public records
are admissible, as in prior Michigan
practice.
Summaries of voluminous writings,
recordings, and the like, which cannot
be conveniently examined in court,
may be presented in the form of a

chart, summary, or calculation, under
the provisions of MRE 1006. The originals or "duplicates" must be made
available for examination or copying
by other parties, and the judge may
order that they be produced in court.
MRE 1007 provides yet two more
ways to establish the contents of documents: by the testimony or deposition
of the party against whom offered or
by his written admission. An extrajudicial oral admission will not suffice.
MRE 1008 is a particularized reference to functions of judge and jury
in dealing with questions of fact preliminary to determinations of admissibility, more generally dealt with in
MRE 104. Here, as in MRE 104, the
question of whether the condition of
fact rendering secondary evidence admissible has been fulfilled (e.g.,
whether the original has been lost) is
left to the judge. But MRE 1008
leaves the "preliminary question" to
the jury when an issue is raised
"(a) whether the asserted writing
ever existed, or (b) whether another
writing ... produced at the trial is
the original, or (c) whether other evidence of contents correctly reflects
the contents .... "
In all of these particulars, there is
no departure from prior Michigan practice.
Article Xl
Miscellaneous Rules
MRE 1101, derived from the Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974) because more appropriate to state practice than the federal counterpart,
makes the Michigan Rules of Evidence
inapplicable, as mentioned in the discussion of MRE 101, supra, to preliminary questions of fact, grand jury
proceedings, miscellaneous proceedings, and summary contempt proceedings. The rule's only departure from
the Uniform Rule lies in omission of
an exception for preliminary examinations, thus making the Michigan
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Rules of Evidence applicable to preliminary examinations, as in prior
Michigan practice. See People v
Walker 385 Mich 565 (1971); People v
Domin, 71 Mich App 315 (1976).

dence will not, of course, end all problems in the law of evidence. If the
rules are adopted, however, everyone
will start from the same source and
that source will be convenient for imRule 1102 authorizes citation of the mediate reference during trial.
rules as MRE - a practice to which
Michigan is fortunate to have had
any reader of this article is by now acthe Federal Rules of Evidence availacustomed.
ble as a model for the proposed Michigan evidence rules. The Federal Rules
CONCLUSION
were the product of over thirteen years
As can be discerned from the forego- of study and debate by eminent judges,
ing, in most instances the proposed lawyers, law
professors and members
Michigan Rules of Evidence are conof Congress.
sistent with prior Michigan law. Those
proposed rules which differ from prior
Adoption of the proposed Michigan
Michigan law involve changes which Rules of Evidence by the Supreme
are logical extensions of established Court will: 1) provide Michigan judges
evidence principles and are consistent and lawyers with an authoritative
with the trend of authority in the statement of evidence law which will
United States and the example set by be easy to use and convenient for imthe Federal Rules of Evidence. The mediate reference; 2) allow Michigan
changes, in other words, are evolution- judges and lawyers to benefit from deary rather than revolutionary.
veloping precedents from the federal
Current Michigan evidence law courts and other states interpreting
must be culled, often with great diffi- nearly identical rules; and 3) prevent
culty, from Supreme Court decisions the confusion and injustice which
(often outdated), Court of Appeals de- could result from one set of evidence
cisions (sometimes conflicting), stat- rules for federal courts in Michigan
utes and court rules. The adoption of and another set of rules for Michigan
the proposed Michigan Rules of Evi- state courts.
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